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Articles
“In the Time of a Woman, Which Sex Was 
Not Capable of Mature Deliberation”:
Late Tudor Parliamentary Relations and 
Their Early Stuart Discontents 
Josh Chafetz* 
INTRODUCTION
It is one of the most well-known incidents in English constitutional 
history. On December 1, 1641, the increasingly restive House of 
Commons presented Charles I with the so-called Grand Remonstrance, a 
list of 206 enumerated grievances, encompassing the entirety of his reign 
to date.1 The King was not amused. On January 3, 1642, he accused five 
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Article was originally prepared as part of 
the lecture series in celebration of the centenary of the Elizabethan Club of Yale University, and I am 
grateful to Justin Zaremby and Steve Parks for inviting me to deliver the lecture and to the audience at 
the Yale Law School for helpful questions and comments. I am also grateful to Greg Alexander, Tom 
McSweeney, Bernie Meyler, Aziz Rana, Josh Stein, and Catherine Roach for helpful and thought-
provoking comments on earlier drafts. Arthur Kutoroff provided excellent research assistance. Any 
remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
1. 1 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS. THE THIRD PART; IN TWO VOLUMES.
33760-ylh_25-2 Sheet No. 4 Side B      07/10/2013   12:28:45
33760-ylh_25-2 Sheet No. 4 Side B      07/10/2013   12:28:45
C M
Y K
CHAFETZ 7/5/2013 12:38 PM 
182 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 25:181 
members of the House of Commons and Lord Kimbolton—all leaders of 
the opposition to the Crown—of treason and sought to have them tried 
before the House of Lords. Even David Hume, whose History of England
is generally charitable toward Charles, refers to this act as “[a]n 
indiscretion, to which all the ensuing disorders and civil wars ought 
immediately and directly to be ascribed.”2 The House of Commons 
immediately passed a resolution authorizing armed resistance to Crown 
officers attempting to arrest any member of Parliament.3 The King 
demanded that the House of Commons turn over the accused members; 
the Commons replied that they would think about it and get back to him.4
The House met the next day, with the five accused members in 
attendance. The Commons Journal entry for that day ends abruptly with 
the following notation: 
His Majesty came into the House; and took Mr. Speaker’s Chair. 
“Gentlemen,”
“I AM sorry to have this Occasion to come unto you[.”]
* * * * 
Resolved, upon the Question, That the House shall adjourn itself 
till To-morrow One of Clock.5
One can only imagine the scene of chaos that must have overwhelmed the 
poor Journals Clerk. Fortunately, his assistant, the indispensable John 
Rushworth, provides the details in his Historical Collections. It seems 
that, shortly after assembling for the day, the House learned that Charles 
was marching on Westminster with a large guard.6 Hoping to avoid 
violence, the House ordered the five accused members to leave; soon 
thereafter, the King and his armed guard threw open the doors to the 
chamber.7 Not seeing the accused members in attendance, he ascended to 
the Speaker’s Chair and harangued the Commons.8 When he demanded 
that the Speaker tell him where the members had gone, the Speaker 
refused, insisting, “I Have neither Eyes to see, nor Tongue to speak in this 
place, but as the House is pleased to direct me.”9
CONTAINING THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS WHICH HAPPENED FROM THE MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT,
NOVEMBER THE 3D. 1640 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1644, at 437-51 (London, Chiswell & Cockerill 
1692) (reprinting the Grand Remonstrance). 
2. 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE 
REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 364 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778). 
3. 2 H.C. JOUR. (1642) 366. 
4. More precisely, they replied that “this House will take it into serious Consideration; and will 
attend his Majesty with Answer, in all Humility and Duty, with as much Speed as the Greatness of the 
Business will permit.” Id. at 367. 
5. Id. at 368 (elision in original). 
6. 1 RUSHWORTH, supra note 1, at 477. 
7. Id.
8. Id. at 477-78. 
9. Id. at 478. 
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As the King left the House in a huff, members were heard to yell, 
“Priviledge! Priviledge!”10 And as the King walked the streets of London 
the next day, commoners were heard to yell “Priviledges of Parliament! 
Priviledges of Parliament!”11 Within a week, Charles left London—the 
next time he would see it, he would be a prisoner. Several days later, the 
House of Commons declared that anyone who arrested a member “by 
Pretence or Colour of any Warrant issuing out from the King only, is 
guilty of the Breach of the Liberties of the Subject, and of the Privilege of 
Parliament, and a publick Enemy to the Commonwealth.”12 Charles soon 
raised his standard at Nottingham; the Battle of Edgehill took place that 
October. 
This chain of events stands in rather marked contrast to previous great 
constitutional conflagrations. Parliament’s origins lie in the practice of the 
King’s taking “counsel with his great men” in order to “promote royal 
ends and policies through cooperative discussion.”13 This group of royal 
councilors was originally undifferentiated—although different advisors 
might attend at different times, it was still essentially one body.14 Over 
time, this group of “great men” expanded to include representatives of the 
counties and the towns,15 and by the end of the thirteenth century, 
Parliament had a clear institutional identity, distinct from other 
mechanisms of royal governance (such as the council and the law 
courts).16 As Parliament developed a more distinct and well-defined 
institutional identity, it began to exercise more power.17 Still, there can be 
10. Id.
11. Id. at 479. 
12. 2 H.C. JOUR. (1642) 373. 
13. J.R. MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327, at 1 (2010); see also 
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 22 (1999) 
(“The acts of those parliaments were acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified 
by counsel and consent.”); A.F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 34 (2d ed. 1926) 
(“Parliament . . . seems to be at first simply a talk or parley of the [King’s] council in full session.”).
14. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY
16-17 (1910) (noting the impossibility of “draw[ing] any definite line between Parliamentum, Curia, 
concilium ordinarium, concilium privatum, magnum concilium, commune concilium”). 
15. See MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 198-204 (noting that, largely as a result of Magna Carta’s
requirement of consent to taxation, shire knights began to be more frequently summoned to 
Parliaments beginning in the 1220s); id. at 204-05 (noting the thirteenth-century summoning of 
burgesses to Parliament). 
16. D.A. CARPENTER, THE REIGN OF HENRY III, at 382 (1996) (noting that the “first ‘official’ use 
of the term parliament” occurs in 1236); see also id. at 381 (declaring “parliament in general and the 
commons in particular” to be “creatures of the thirteenth century”); MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 165 
(“By 1258 parliament had gone some way towards becoming an institution.”). The same process of 
role-differentiation can also be seen from the point of view of other institutions. See Thomas 
McSweeney, English Judges and Roman Jurists: The Civilian Learning Behind England’s First Case 
Law, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832-33 (2012) (noting the efforts by the jurists and clerks of the royal 
courts in the mid-thirteenth century to differentiate their functions and roles from those of other parts 
of the royal administration). 
17. See MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 169 (noting the mid-thirteenth century emergence of 
Parliament “as a political force”). 
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no doubt that it served primarily as an engine of royal government. As 
Pollard describes Parliaments under Edward I, “He wanted money and 
they wanted redress of grievances; but their petitions were local or 
personal, and the initiative in public legislation still lay with the King and 
his ministers who alone possessed the knowledge, outlook, and 
circumspection essential to the comprehension of national problems.”18
Or, in Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s words, “[t]he acts of those parliaments were 
acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified by counsel 
and consent.”19
On those few occasions—radical caesurae in English constitutional 
history—on which royal government broke down, it was the higher 
nobility, not the knights and burgesses, who stepped forward. The 1258 
rebellion against Henry III was led by the baronial class;20 only afterwards 
did Simon de Montfort (himself an earl) summon representatives of the 
shires to discuss the state of the kingdom.21 Likewise, as Maddicott notes, 
opposition to Edward I’s expensive foreign adventuring “was headed by 
the magnates, naturally enough.”22 And when opposition to his son, 
Edward II, began to build, it was the lords who took the lead in exiling his 
favorites, using the commoners simply as political cover against the 
charge of a baronial coup.23 Again, in 1327, “as was only to be expected, 
the initiators of Edward’s deposition were not the commons but the lords,”
who once more looked to the knights and burgesses simply to provide 
political cover,24 a pattern that repeated yet again when Richard II was 
deposed in favor of Henry IV in 1399.25 Similarly, the Parliaments 
summoned during the Wars of the Roses were little more than tools used 
by whomever summoned them to attaint the rival claimant and announce 
their patron’s right to the throne.26 It is true enough that Henry Tudor 
summoned a Parliament in 1485 to pass an Act of Succession, ratifying his 
right to rule as Henry VII,27 but we should be careful not to be overly 
legalistic about it. Henry VII was King when Richard’s crown was placed 
18. A.F. POLLARD, PARLIAMENT IN THE WARS OF THE ROSES 7 (1936); see also Simon Payling, 
The Later Middle Ages, in THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: SEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH TRADITION
48, 55 (Robert Smith & John S. Moore eds., 1996) (noting that the “chief importance” of 
parliamentary power over taxation lay in the fact that it gave the commons an opportunity to present 
petitions and seek redress of grievances from the Crown). 
19. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 22; see also id. at 29. 
20. See CARPENTER, supra note 16, at 183-97. 
21. See id. at 392-93. 
22. MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 308. 
23. Id. at 337. 
24. Id. at 359-60. 
25. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that, in the depositions of Edward II and 
Richard II, “the responsible magnates ensured that the supposed assent of the three estates of the 
realm . . . was formally recorded”). 
26. See POLLARD, supra note 18, at 10-11. 
27. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 32. 
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on his head at Bosworth;28 parliamentary assent was an afterthought. 
Writing in the midst of the Wars of the Roses, Sir John Fortescue 
referred to the English Crown as exercising dominium politicum et 
regale—political and royal lordship.29 This was meant to differentiate it 
from the French Crown, which exercised simple dominium regale—royal 
lordship.30 The former required consent to taxation, whereas the latter did 
not.31 The Monarch’s position in England was not quite the Monarch’s
position in France; Parliament was an essential cog in the governance of 
the English realm. But it was still first and foremost the Monarch’s realm. 
The King’s lordship may be political as well as royal, but lordship it 
remained.32 Parliament was still distinctly secondary; its job was to 
“advise and assist [the King] in transacting the affairs of the realm.”33 As 
Simon Payling has noted, “The late medieval House of Commons 
certainly did not see itself as engaged in a struggle with the Crown for 
sovereignty, or even for a share in the formulation and execution of 
policy.”34
The question, then, is what happens between 1485 and 1642? That is, 
how do we get from a world in which a civil war is fought amongst the 
baronial class and the Commons is used simply as a tool to confirm the 
fait accompli of Tudor victory to a world in which the Commons leads the 
revolt against the Stuart Crown? I should be clear here about the nature of 
my inquiry: I am not asking about the “causes” of the English Civil War. 
28. Although there is debate among historians as to where precisely on the battlefield Richard’s
circlet was found, there seems to be general acceptance that it was, in fact, found at Bosworth Field 
and placed on Henry’s head after the battle. Compare S.B. CHRIMES, HENRY VII 49 n.1 (1999) 
(arguing that the circlet was found “amidst the spoils of the battle” but not, as later mythology had it, 
in a hawthorn bush), with CHARLES ROSS, RICHARD III 225 n.52 (1981) (arguing that the hawthorn 
bush would not have become so central to Tudor iconography were the story not true). Shakespeare, of 
course, does not tell us where the crown was found, but shows us Lord Stanley crowning Henry with 
it: “Lo, here this long-usurpèd royalty / From the dead temples of this bloody wretch / Have I plucked 
off, to grace thy brows withal. / Wear it, enjoy it, and make much of it.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
RICHARD III act 5, sc. 5, ll. 4-7 (Yale Univ. Press ann. ed. 2008). Henry’s right to rule is thus figured 
as a consequence of the brute fact of military victory, not of the Act of Succession. 
29. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND: OTHERWISE CALLED THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY 109-16 (Charles Plummer ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1885) (c. 1471) [hereinafter FORTESCUE ORIGINAL]. For a modern 
translation of the text, see SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, The Governance of England, in ON THE LAWS AND 
GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 81, 83-90 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (c. 1471) 
[hereinafter FORTESCUE TRANSLATED]. 
30. FORTESCUE ORIGINAL, supra note 29, at 113; FORTESCUE TRANSLATED, supra note 29, at 87. 
31. FORTESCUE ORIGINAL, supra note 29, at 109; FORTESCUE TRANSLATED, supra note 29, at 83. 
32. As Alan Cromartie has persuasively argued, the value of consent for Fortescue was not 
inherent—that is, not because of some theory of representation—but rather as “a sign that kings had 
taken appropriate counsel.” ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450-1642, at 24 (2006). See also id. at 27-28, 30 (further elaborating on 
Fortescue’s understanding of the role of consent). Parliamentary consent was thus a device that 
allowed the monarch to make better decisions for his kingdom, not a device for sharing sovereign 
power. 
33. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 32. 
34. Payling, supra note 18, at 48. 
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A voluminous literature on that topic already exists, pointing to political,35
religious,36 economic,37 social,38 and cultural39 factors that led to the 
revolt, and this Article has no new causal candidates to put forward.40
Rather, it is focused on the following institutional question, a question that 
has not received nearly as much attention: What allowed the House of 
Commons to serve as the locus of discontent? How were the members of 
the House of Commons able to develop the esprit de corps, the 
constitutional self-confidence, and the justificatory language that enabled 
them to take the lead in a war against Charles I?41
My argument here is that, to answer this question, we must attend 
carefully to developments in matters of institutional procedure, beginning 
roughly in the middle of Henry VIII’s reign. These developments might 
individually seem minor and purely internal to Parliament, which may 
well explain why they have been largely overlooked by scholars, who 
have seen the late Tudor period as one of monarchical domination of 
Parliament. But this Article contends that, in the aggregate, these 
procedural developments allowed the House of Commons to begin to 
understand itself as a key constitutional actor in its own right—that is, 
they allowed it to begin to see itself as an essential element in the 
35. See, e.g., CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 3 (“This book sets out to recreate the intellectual 
world in which the aspirations of the godly fitted into a political solution to the crisis of the Stuart 
monarchy.”); Noah Millstone, Evil Counsel: The Propositions to Bridle the Impertinency of 
Parliament and the Critique of Caroline Government in the Late 1620s, 50 J. BRIT. STUD. 813, 815 
(2011) (“[P]roblems of constitutional change and tyranny formed a critical part of early Stuart political 
life; in other words, they were native categories.”); see also William H. Dray, J.H. Hexter, Neo-
Whiggism and Early Stuart Historiography, 26 HIST. & THEORY 133, 139-43 (1987) (discussing 
historian J.H. Hexter’s political account of the Civil War). 
36. See, e.g., JOHN MORRILL, THE NATURE OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 68 (1993) (“The 
English civil war was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion.”); S.K. 
Baskerville, Puritans, Revisionists, and the English Revolution, 61 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 151, 153 
(1998) (“Only by confronting the content of religious zeal squarely can we begin to see the radicalism 
of the English Revolution and of Puritanism within it.”). 
37. See, e.g., Christopher Hill, A Bourgeois Revolution?, in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641,
1688, 1776, at 109, 111 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980) (arguing that the English Civil War was “made 
possible by the fact that there had already been a considerable development of capitalist relations in 
England”); Christopher Hill, Introduction to THE GOOD OLD CAUSE: THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF 
1640-1660, at 19, 20-31 (Christopher Hill & Edmund Dell eds., 2d ed. 1969) (summarizing the 
economic causes of the Civil War). 
38. See, e.g., H.R. TREVOR-ROPER, THE GENTRY 1540-1640, at 26-53 (1960) (describing the Civil 
War in terms of the Court-Country divide); Conrad Russell, Why Did Charles I Fight the Civil War?,
HIST. TODAY, June 1984, at 31, 32-33 (describing the Civil War as a baronial rebellion akin to earlier 
instances of the magnates rising against the crown). 
39. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, “Our Cities Institutions” and the Institution of the Common 
Law, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 441, 442 (2010) (suggesting that Jacobean drama played a role in 
“deliberat[ions] about legal and political arguments”).
40. Conrad Russell, whose groundbreaking study set out to match specific Civil War “effects” to 
a myriad of causes, began by noting that “we [historians] have certainly spilt enough ink on the causes 
of the English Civil War.” CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 1 (1990). 
41. Because this Article focuses on events culminating in 1642, I do not here discuss the later 
power struggle between the House of Commons and Cromwell’s New Model Army, leading in 1648 
to Pride’s Purge and the Rump Parliament. 
33760-ylh_25-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      07/10/2013   12:28:45
33760-ylh_25-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      07/10/2013   12:28:45
C M
Y K
CHAFETZ 7/5/2013 12:38 PM 
2013] Chafetz 187 
governance of the realm, rather than as an element of royal governance. 
When the first two Stuart monarchs attempted to roll back the gains that 
the House had made in these areas under Henry VIII and Elizabeth, the 
House fought back, all the while continuing to hone its sense of its 
constitutional place.42 The issues of institutional procedure discussed in 
this Article fall under the general heading of parliamentary privilege.43
The best-known privilege of Parliament is freedom of speech and 
debate—and it is not coincidental that the practice of demanding this 
privilege in the Speaker’s petition to the Crown at the beginning of a new 
parliamentary session dates to the reign of Henry VIII (1541, to be 
precise).44 In this Article, however, I intend to focus on two lesser-studied 
elements of parliamentary privilege in this period: the House’s power over 
its own composition and its power to hold outsiders in contempt of 
Parliament. 
Part I traces the transformation of these powers from tools of royalist 
government to tools of Parliament in its own right. This transformation 
took place during the late Tudor period—that is, roughly the period from 
the last decade of Henry VIII’s reign through the end of Elizabeth’s. Part 
II traces the early Stuart reaction against and dismissal of these late Tudor 
precedents, including James I’s dismissal of an Elizabethan precedent with 
the line that gave this Article its title.45 But the institutional self-
confidence that it had gained in the course of winning its privileges from 
Henry VIII and Elizabeth allowed the House of Commons to push back 
with increasing fortitude against James’s and Charles’s attempts at 
42. In writing this, I am well aware of recent controversies over the extent to which most 
members of the House were concerned with local affairs, to the exclusion of great matters of state. 
Compare Glenn Burgess, On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s 
and 1980s, 33 HIST. J. 609, 619-20 (1990) (noting that “local studies” of mid-seventeenth century 
England have shown that “[t]he ‘political nation’ (divided into Royalists and Parliamentarians) 
[consisted of] two tiny groups of zealots struggling to overcome the apathy and indifference of 
everyone else . . . . For many of the English gentry the major aim in the 1640s was to preserve the 
local community, their country, from disruption . . . .”), with CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 219-20 
(arguing that revisionist scholarship has both overstated the provincialism of members of Parliament 
of the era and erroneously treated provincialism as apolitical), and LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OF 
THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1529-1642, at 168-69 (rev. ed. 2002) (arguing both that local leaders had 
numerous attachments with the government at London and that local elites were deeply concerned 
with national politics). But even if we take the revisionist claims at face value and read the grand 
actions in the House of Commons as reflecting only the interests of a dedicated few who made such 
issues their own, it is still no less important to ask why and how they were able to situate this 
opposition in the House. And how did their arguments for authority in the House come to be so 
compelling that people on the street in London chastised the King for his infringement on 
parliamentary privilege? See supra text accompanying note 11. These are the questions that I seek to 
answer here. 
43. On parliamentary privilege generally, see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
(2007); and CARL WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921). 
44. See CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 70; F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 242 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963). 
45. See infra text accompanying note 97. 
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retrenchment. The Conclusion completes the circle, returning to Charles 
I’s flight from London, and points toward the lasting consequences of this 
chain of events. 
I. THE LATE TUDORS
A. Composition of the House 
When Parliament’s role was merely to assist the King in governing his 
realm, it made sense that any questions about Parliament’s composition 
would be settled by the King, either personally or via his designated 
agents.46 And that is precisely what we see in early disputes over 
parliamentary elections. Thus, in 1319, Mathew de Cranthorn petitioned 
the King’s Council, claiming that he had been elected a knight of the shire 
for the county of Devon, but had been deprived of his seat by a false return 
by the sheriff. The Council referred the petition to the Court of 
Exchequer—that is, to the King’s justice—for adjudication.47 In 1384, 
Thomas Camoyes, a minor noble, was returned a knight of the shire for 
Surrey. Being a peer of the realm, he was ineligible, and his election was 
accordingly voided by Richard II and his Council, which then issued a 
writ for the election of a new knight of the shire.48 And in 1413, Henry IV 
actually turned a disputed Commons election over to the “discretions” of 
the Lords.49 Nor was royal control over parliamentary composition limited 
to entering the House; those seeking to leave parliamentary service had to 
seek royal permission, which was not infrequently denied.50
But this state of affairs began to change in the mid-sixteenth century. In 
1553, during Mary’s reign, the House of Commons took an active role in 
determining an election result for the first time. Alexander Nowell was 
returned as the member for the borough of West Looe in Cornwall, but his 
election was challenged on the grounds that he was a church official and 
therefore ineligible.51 A committee, appointed by the House to investigate, 
reported back that he was, indeed, ineligible; the House accepted the 
46. See G.R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 253 (1960) 
(noting, of parliamentary privilege generally, that it was “intended to enable an institution which the 
king required for his purposes to do the work which he demanded from it”). 
47. JOHN GLANVILLE, REPORTS OF CERTAIN CASES, DETERMINED AND ADJUDGED BY THE 
COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT, IN THE TWENTY-FIRST AND TWENTY-SECOND YEARS OF THE REIGN OF 
KING JAMES THE FIRST, at xi-xii (London, Baker & Leigh 1775). I thank Tom McSweeney for help 
with the translation. 
48. Id. at xvi-xvii. I again thank Tom McSweeney for help with the translation. 
49. Id. at xx-xxi. 
50. See Betty Kemp, The Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, in ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR 
LEWIS NAMIER 204, 205 (Richard Pares & A.J.P. Taylor eds., 1956); Josh Chafetz, Leaving the 
House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 
185 (2008). 
51. 3 S.T. BINDOFF, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1509-1558, at 28-
29 (1982). 
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Committee’s report; and the Speaker asked the Queen to issue a writ for a 
new election.52 Whether or not she in fact ordered a new election has been 
lost to history,53 but the Commons were just getting started. It was during 
Elizabeth’s reign that the jurisdictional clash over election disputes really 
came to the fore. 
Elizabeth’s fourth Parliament, elected in 1572, did not meet between 
1576 and 1581. In those years, naturally, some members had died, become 
seriously ill, or gone abroad in the Queen’s service. In preparation for the 
1581 session, the Lord Chancellor accordingly issued writs of election to 
choose replacements. When the House convened, however, it was moved 
that “divers Persons being newly returned in the Places of others, yet 
living, were not, or ought to be accounted, Members of this House.”54 In 
other words, the motion disputed the right of the Crown to declare vacant 
the seats of those elected members who were still alive. The newly 
returned claimants were asked to step aside while their membership was 
debated.55 Supporters of their right to sit argued that “it sufficeth to make 
suggestion in the Chancery, and to procure a Writ thereupon for a new 
Election. And to question this was to discredit the Lord Chancellor and to 
scandalize the Judicial Proceedings of that Court.”56 Here, then, we have a 
jurisdictional clash. Those who wanted to debate the claimants’ right to sit 
thought, relying on the Nowell precedent, that such things were 
examinable in the House. Those who disagreed thought that the mere fact 
of an election writ issued out from Chancery was sufficient—that is, they 
thought that, once royal officials had made clear how they wished the 
matter to be settled, the House should fall meekly in line. It was the 
partisans of the House’s own power who carried the day: after receiving a 
committee report, the House readmitted those members who were still 
living and voided the election of their replacements.57 The House also 
issued a strong rebuke to the Lord Chancellor, resolving that, “during the 
time of sitting of this Court, there do not at any time any Writ go out for 
the chusing or returning of any Knight, Citizen, Burgess, or Baron without 
the Warrant of this House first directed for the same to the Clerk of the 
Crown . . . .”58 The Commons thus asserted that they had the exclusive 
right to judge in matters of their own composition. 
This right was put to the test a mere five years later. In the 1586 
elections to Elizabeth’s sixth Parliament, the county of Norfolk returned 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1581) 117. 
55. Id.
56. SIMONDS D’EWES, THE JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN 
ELIZABETH 281-82 (Paul Bowes ed., London, Starkey 1682). 
57. Id. at 307-08. 
58. Id. at 308. 
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Thomas Farmer and William Gresham as shire knights. This election was 
protested in Chancery, and another election writ was issued. This time, 
Gresham and Christopher Heydon were returned. When the House 
convened, it opened an inquiry into the Norfolk election.59 Elizabeth, 
however, wanted to reassert her authority—via the Lord Chancellor—to 
resolve disputed elections, and she had the Lord Chancellor inform the 
House that it was “in truth impertinent” for it to consider electoral 
disputes, which “only belong[] to the Charge and Office of the Lord 
Chancellor, from whence the Writs for the same Elections issued out, and 
are thither returnable again.”60 The House promptly ignored this rebuke 
and appointed a committee to examine the Norfolk returns;61 this 
committee concluded that the first election was conducted properly.62
Apparently, the Lord Chancellor, after consulting with some of the judges, 
had come to the same conclusion;63 the committee wanted it known, 
however, that it was its conclusion that counted. Accordingly, it resolved 
that it was 
prejudicial to the priviledge of the House to have the same 
determined by others than such as were Members thereof. And 
though they thought very reverently of the said Lord Chancellor 
and Judges, and thought them competent Judges in their places; yet 
in this case they took them not for Judges in Parliament in this 
House.64
The committee thus quite literally sought to put royal officials “in their 
places.” The House accepted the committee’s report and passed its own 
resolution stating 
[t]hat it was a most perilous Precedent, that after two Knights of a 
County were duly Elected, any new Writ should issue out for a 
second Election without order of the House of Commons it 
self . . . . 
That the discussing and adjudging of this and such like differences, 
only belonged to the said House . . . . 
That though the Lord Chancellor and Judges were competent 
Judges in their proper Courts, yet they were not in Parliament.65
Elizabeth yielded, and Thomas Farmer took his seat.66 By the end of the 
sixteenth century, then, admission to the House of Commons had passed 
59. GLANVILLE, supra note 47, at xlii-xliii. 
60. D’EWES, supra note 56, at 393. 
61. Id. at 396. 
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 397. 
66. See 2 P.W. HASLER, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1558-1603, at 
106-07 (1981). 
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from being a matter of royal judgment to a matter of parliamentary 
judgment.67 Or, put differently, the Crown was no longer the legal 
gatekeeper to the House of Commons.68
And, of course, gates tend to swing both ways, so it is unsurprising that 
the House was simultaneously asserting exclusive jurisdiction over the 
resignations of its members. No longer did members who wished to leave 
Parliament seek the permission of the Crown to do so; rather, beginning 
with Elizabeth’s long parliament (1572-1583), they had to seek the 
permission of the House itself.69 This, of course, makes perfect sense if the 
House now understood its members to be servants of the House, rather 
than servants of the Crown.70
B. Contempt of Parliament and Breach of Privilege 
At almost exactly the same time, this same understanding of the House 
of Commons as a body with a distinct and powerful constitutional identity 
began to assert itself in contempt of Parliament proceedings as well. The 
story here has a similar outline to the elections story.71 At first, because 
Parliament was an instrument of royal governance, contempt of 
Parliament was an offense against the Crown. Thus, in 1404, when John 
Sallage “emblemished and maimed even to the peril of death” the servant 
of a member of Parliament, Henry IV ordered Sallage to appear before the 
King’s Bench, where he was ordered to pay double damages, plus a fine 
67. Andrew Thrush suggests that the House “beat a hasty retreat” from its stand in the Norfolk 
election controversy when, in 1589, a committee resolved that “this House is to take notice of all 
Returns only in such sort as the same shall be certified unto this House by the Clerk of the Crown in 
the Chancery and not otherwise.” D’EWES, supra note 56, at 430; see also Andrew Thrush, Commons 
v. Chancery: The 1604 Buckinghamshire Election Dispute Revisited, 26 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 301, 
302 (2007). But Thrush stopped reading too quickly, for the committee immediately went on to void 
the election for the borough of Appleby and to recommend the granting of a new election writ, an 
opinion that was “well liked of by this House.” D’EWES, supra note 56, at 430. See also id. at 441 
(seating a member for the Port of New Rumney despite the fact that the Clerk of the Crown had not 
yet certified his election). And in the midst of a 1601 election dispute, when it was inquired whether, if 
the returned member were not seated, a new election warrant should issue out from the Speaker of the 
House or from the Clerk of the Crown, “it was agreed per omnes, that from the Speaker.” Id. at 624; 
see also Thrush, supra, at 303-04 (describing this incident). The House’s practice post-1586 thus 
seems fully consistent with its resolution of the Norfolk election. 
68. J.E. Neale succinctly summarized the stakes of this transition: “There can be no doubt as to 
where, by [prior] constitutional theory, jurisdiction lay. It lay with the Crown in Chancery. Equally 
there can be no doubt about the practical issue involved. If the Crown—through Council or Chancery, 
or both—could quash elections displeasing to itself and order new ones, then, when hard-driven and 
unscrupulous, it could take steps to exclude troublesome critics from Parliament.” 2 J.E. NEALE,
ELIZABETH I AND HER PARLIAMENTS, 1584-1601, at 184 (1957). See also RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 
41 (noting fears of royal “power to control the Parliament by controlling its membership”). 
69. See Kemp, supra note 50, at 205; see also sources cited in id. at 205 nn.2-4. 
70. Elton and Neale thus view the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over disputed elections as 
evidence of the House’s political maturation. See ELTON, supra note 46, at 254; 2 NEALE, supra note 
68, at 185. 
71. For more extended discussions of contempt of Parliament, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 
193-206; and Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1093-
119 (2009). 
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and ransom to the Crown.72 And in 1433, a statute made double damages, 
fine, and ransom the punishments for all cases of assault upon a member 
of Parliament.73 Indeed, it is worth noting the enacting language of this 
statute: “The King willing to provide for the Ease and Tranquility of them 
that come to the Parliaments and Councils of the King by his 
Commandment, hath ordained and stablished . . . .”74 As long as the 
Crown was the motive force in the political state—as long as the King 
“ordained and stablished” laws—it made perfect sense to consider 
contempts against Parliament (that is, against his advisory body) as 
contempts against himself. Thus, the statute treats parliaments identically 
to councils: both are mechanisms by which subjects participate in royal 
governance. And the penalties for assaulting parliamentarians and 
councillors were not only meted out by royal justice; they also included 
fines and ransoms payable to the Crown.
But, as with jurisdiction over disputed elections, the location of the 
contempt power began to change in the mid-sixteenth century. The 
defining moment came with the arrest of George Ferrers in 1542. Ferrers 
was a member of Parliament from Plymouth when he was arrested in 
London pursuant to an action in the King’s Bench to recover a debt (for 
which Ferrers served as a surety).75 Upon being notified of his arrest, the 
House of Commons sent its sergeant to demand his release; the jailers, 
however, refused to turn him over. A physical confrontation ensued, and 
the sergeant was forced to flee back to the House.76 The Lord Chancellor, 
a Crown official, offered to arm the sergeant with a royal writ for Ferrers’s
release, but, in a remarkable move, the House of Commons declined his 
assistance, declaring that “all commandments and other acts proceeding 
from the [House of Commons], were to be done and executed by their 
Serjeant without writ, only by shew of his mace, which was his warrant.”77
In other words, they did not want him released because the Crown said so; 
they wanted him released because they said so. 
By this point, word had gotten out that the House of Commons was on 
the warpath, and the jailers holding Ferrers decided to surrender him 
without a fight when the sergeant returned. But securing Ferrers’s release 
was not enough; the House also committed to prison the sheriffs and 
jailers who had held Ferrers and the person upon whose suit Ferrers had 
72. HENRY ELSYNGE, THE MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND 189-91 (London, 
Richardson & Clark 1768). 
73. 11 Hen. 6, c. 11 (1433). 
74. Id.
75. 1 JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS; WITH 
OBSERVATIONS 53 (London, Hughs 2d ed. 1785). 
76. Id. at 53-54. 
77. Id. at 54-55. 
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been arrested.78 Special pains were reserved for the jailer who had started 
the physical confrontation with the sergeant—he was committed to the 
Little Ease dungeon of the Tower of London, a cell so small that the 
prisoner could not fully stretch out in any direction.79 The House’s
prisoners were only released after the Mayor of London and other 
powerful friends made “humble suit” to the House on their behalf.80
But the matter was not quite finished, for, in addition to being a member 
of Parliament, Ferrers was in the King’s service.81 After the Commons had 
resolved the matter, freeing Ferrers on its own authority and imprisoning 
those who had arrested him, Henry called prominent members of the 
House before him: 
First commending their wisdome in maintaining the Privileges of 
the House (which he would not have to be infringed in any point) 
alledged that he, being head of the Parliament, and attending in his 
own person upon the business thereof, ought in reason to have 
Privilege for him, and all his servants attending there upon him. So 
that if the said Ferrers had been no Burgess, but only his servant, 
that in respect thereof he was to have the Privilege, as well as any 
other. For I understand, quoth he, that you, not only for your own 
persons, but also for your necessary servants, even to your cooks 
and horse-keepers, enjoy the said Privilege . . . . And further, we be 
informed by our Judges; that we at no time stand so highly in our 
Estate Royal, as in the time of Parliament; wherein we as Head, 
and you as Members, are conjoin’d and knit together into one 
Body Politick, so as whatsoever offence or injury (during that 
time) is offered to the meanest Member of the House, is to be 
judg’d as done against our Person and the whole Court of 
Parliament; which prerogative of the Court is so great (as our 
learned Counsel informeth us) as all acts and processes coming out 
of any other inferior Courts, must for the time cease and give place 
to the highest.82
Beneath the superficial pleasantries here lies a serious struggle over 
Parliament’s role in the constitutional order. The King is attempting to 
reassert the House’s role as his advisory body. His claim that his servants 
should be afforded privilege is a claim that privilege is meant to help the 
House serve him. Just as the House of Commons’s rejection of the Lord 
Chancellor’s proffered writ constituted a statement about the role of the 
House in the English Constitution, the King’s speech constituted his 
rejoinder. The House asserted that it could act by itself, for itself. The 
78. Id. at 55-56. 
79. Id. at 55. On the Little Ease, see L.A. PARRY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE IN ENGLAND 80 
(1975). 
80. 1 HATSELL, supra note 75, at 55-56. 
81. See 2 BINDOFF, supra note 51, at 130. 
82. 1 HATSELL, supra note 75, at 56-57. 
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King insisted that the House’s actions were necessarily in his service.83
But Henry’s words notwithstanding, it was the House’s deeds that set 
the tone for the future. Henceforth, it would be the House, and the House 
alone, that would punish contempt of Parliament and breach of 
parliamentary privilege. In doing so, the House would assert an 
institutional identity distinct from the Crown. Contempts were no longer 
interferences with the functioning of royal governance; instead, they were 
interferences with the House’s ability to do its own business. And this shift 
had an important corollary: it now became possible to conceive of 
contempts committed by Crown officials, or even by Monarchs 
themselves. After all, when Parliament was just one instrument of royal 
governance, a dispute between it and some other instrument of royal 
governance could be settled by reference to a supervening authority: the 
will of the King. But once Parliament stood outside of royal governance, 
there was no supervening power, and Crown officials, like everyone else, 
could run afoul of the contempt power. Thus, for example, throughout the 
1560s and 1570s, we see a repeating pattern in which the House irks the 
Queen (usually by poking its nose into issues of succession and/or 
religion); Elizabeth responds by ordering them to cease their discussions 
or by detaining a member; the House howls that the Queen has breached 
its privileges; and the Queen backs down.84 The language of contempt and 
breach of privilege was powerful, even against the Monarch herself. 
We thus have a moment in the mid-sixteenth century—a time when 
many historians have viewed the House of Commons as “very 
submissive,” in Maitland’s words85—in which we can see the House 
carving out for itself a distinct institutional identity. It is, of course, true 
that the initiative on great matters of state remained with the Crown 
throughout the Tudor period.86 But beneath the surface, in these disputes 
83. Cromartie, in discussing this passage, has likewise observed that Henry’s remarks were “less a 
claim that kingship was parliamentary than that the houses of parliament were royal.” CROMARTIE,
supra note 32, at 79. But Cromartie discusses only Henry’s speech to the members of the House, 
completely ignoring the back-and-forth between crown officials and members of the House. He 
therefore misses the extent to which this episode marked a rising assertiveness on the House’s part—
an assertiveness against which Henry was pushing. 
84. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1098-100. 
85. MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 242; see also CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 92, 98 (suggesting 
that English government under Mary and Elizabeth can accurately be characterized as absolutist); 
STONE, supra note 42, at 59 (“After many years in which it has not been respectable to use the phrase 
in academic circles, the concept of ‘Tudor despotism’, as an aspiration if not a reality, is at last 
becoming something that can be talked about again.”). 
86. Wallace Notestein famously located the House’s “winning of the initiative” in the reign of 
James I, and described Elizabeth as having “the whip hand” over the House of Commons. WALLACE
NOTESTEIN, THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 13 (photo reprint 1971) 
(1926). Notestein’s focus was on legislation, and he accordingly noted that parliamentary upstarts like 
Strickland and Wentworth were unable to overcome the power of the Crown, as exercised via Privy 
Councillors in the House, in matters such as religion, succession, etc. But Notestein overlooked the 
ways in which Parliament’s struggles with Henry and Elizabeth over its privileges laid the groundwork 
for its struggles with James and Charles over affairs of state. 
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over parliamentary privilege, the House began to carve out essential space 
in which it controlled admission and in which it kept order. 
And then the Stuarts came. 
II. THE EARLY STUARTS
A. Composition of the House 
In his very first parliamentary summons, in 1604, James I directed that 
election returns should be made in Chancery, which would judge any 
election or qualification disputes.87 In Buckinghamshire, Sir Francis 
Goodwin had defeated Sir John Fortescue;88 Goodwin, however, had been 
outlawed for personal debt, and the Crown thus directed that a new writ 
should issue, as James’s summons had forbidden the election of outlaws.89
The House of Commons, determining that outlawry in personal actions did 
not create a disqualification to serve in Parliament, resolved that Goodwin 
was the rightfully elected member from Buckinghamshire and proceeded 
to seat him.90 Fortescue, it should be noted, was a Privy Councillor, and 
James seems to have taken a personal interest in his career.91 The King 
was therefore naturally unsatisfied with the Commons’ determination, and 
he asked the Lords to look into the matter. The Lords resolved that 
Goodwin was disqualified and that the seat should have gone to Fortescue, 
and they sought a conference with the Commons to explain their reasons.92
The Commons declined, on the grounds that “it did not stand with the 
Honour and Order of the House, to give Account of any of their 
Proceedings or Doings” to the Lords.93
The Commons then sought a meeting with James himself, and the King 
granted the Speaker an audience.94 James insisted that “he had no Purpose 
to impeach [the House’s] Privilege: But since they derived all Matters of 
Privilege from him, and by his Grant, he expected they should not be 
turned against him.”95 In other words, he was attempting the same gambit 
that Henry VIII tried in Ferrers’s case—he was asserting that privilege 
87. GODFREY DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS, 1603-1660, at 2 (1952); see also Thrush, supra note 
67, at 304-06 (describing how Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s maneuverings were designed to create a 
clash between Chancery and the Commons). 
88. On the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy generally, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 147-48. 
89. GEORGE PETYT, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA: OR, A TREASTISE OF THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE 
PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND 299-301 (London, Goodwin 1690). 
90. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 151-52; see also PETYT, supra note 89, at 302-04 (laying out the House’s
reasons). 
91. See WITTKE, supra note 43, at 58-59; see also CONRAD RUSSELL, KING JAMES VI AND I AND 
HIS ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS 28 (Richard Cust & Andrew Thrush eds., 2011) (noting the unusual 
“depth of involvement of an inexperienced king” in the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy). 
92. PETYT, supra note 89, at 304-05. 
93. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 156. 
94. PETYT, supra note 89, at 306-07. 
95. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 158. 
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existed to help Parliament serve the Crown, not to allow Parliament to 
resist the Crown. And what of the Elizabethan precedent, from the case of 
the Norfolk election? After all, that case seemed clearly to stand for the 
proposition that the House, and not the Crown, had the final word on 
parliamentary composition.96 It did not bind, James asserted, because it 
occurred “in the Time of a Woman, which Sex was not capable of Mature 
Deliberation.”97 Using Elizabeth’s gender as a convenient excuse,98 James 
was seeking to roll back the gains the House had made in the previous 
century. 
The House would not yield, with one member insisting that the issue 
had now “become the Case of the whole kingdom” because, if Chancery 
were to win, “the free election of the country is taken away, and none shall 
be chosen but such as shall please the king and council.”99 The House 
drew up a petition setting out its reasons for accepting Goodwin as the 
rightfully returned member, as well as asserting its exclusive jurisdiction 
over election returns.100 Finally, James proposed a compromise: neither 
Goodwin nor Fortescue would have the seat; instead, there would be yet 
another election for the Buckinghamshire seat.101 Moreover, at the King’s
suggestion, the House quietly admitted both Goodwin and Fortescue for 
other seats.102 But the House wanted to ensure that its acceptance of the 
compromise could not be construed as acquiescence on the jurisdictional 
point; it therefore appointed a committee, which drew up a document titled 
The Form of an Apology or Satisfaction of the House of Commons 
Concerning Their Privileges. The Apology reiterated the House’s claim 
that “the House of Commons is the sole proper Judge of the Return of all 
96. Derek Hirst has insisted that the Elizabethan precedents “left the central issue of ultimate 
jurisdiction undecided” and therefore that “there was still no universally accepted precedent to guide 
the parties” in the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy. Derek Hirst, Elections and the Privileges of the 
House of Commons in the Early Seventeenth Century: Confrontation or Compromise?, 18 HIST. J.
851, 852 (1975). But this conclusion seems unsupported, not only by the results of the 1581 
controversy, see supra text accompanying notes 54-58, but also by the stridency of the House’s
language—language that went unrebutted by the Crown—in the case of the Norfolk election, see 
supra text accompanying notes 59-68. Moreover, the fact that James resorted to an ad feminam
argument against the Monarch who acceded to parliamentary jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying 
note 97, suggests that he, at least, thought that the outcome of the Elizabethan cases was clear—and 
clearly bad. Contra Hirst, then, the best interpretation is not that the 1581 and 1586 precedents were 
ambiguous, but rather that James was attempting to overturn those precedents and return to an earlier 
understanding of the relationship between Crown and Parliament. 
97. PETYT, supra note 89, at 309. 
98. This certainly does not make James unique. As Natalie Mears has persuasively argued, 
gendered attacks on Elizabeth, even during her life, were most often used, not as attacks on female 
monarchy as such, but rather as a convenient language for opposition rooted in other factors. See
NATALIE MEARS, QUEENSHIP AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE ELIZABETHAN REALMS 222-29 
(2005). 
99. 1 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1003 (London, Hansard 1806). 
100. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 162-65. 
101. Id. at 168, 171. 
102. See Hirst, supra note 96, at 853. 
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such Writs, and of the Election of all such Members as belong unto it.”103
Moreover, the Apology insisted, Chancery’s role was limited to sending 
out the writs of election, receiving the returns, and preserving them for the 
House, “yet the same is done only for the Use of the Parliament.”104 This 
is the mirror image of Henry’s and James’s claims that Parliament exists 
to serve the Crown; here, the House is insisting that Crown officers exist 
to serve the House of Commons. As Derek Hirst has noted, the most 
salient feature of the Goodwin-Fortescue incident was “the passion 
displayed by members in their resistance to the Council’s attempt to 
unseat Goodwin.”105 Against a Monarch who sought to roll back the 
House’s gains under the Tudors, the House pushed back, continuing to 
develop a sense of itself as an essential and independent component of the 
constitutional state.106
B. Contempt of Parliament and Breach of Privilege 
This clash of constitutional visions was even more apparent in an 
incident that occurred toward the end of James’s reign. In 1620, James, in 
need of funds, summoned a new Parliament. When it assembled in 1621, it 
was more interested in discussing—and decrying—rumors of a Spanish 
Match than it was in voting him supply. James immediately dashed off a 
letter to the Speaker, demanding that he “acquaint that house with our 
pleasure, that none therein shall presume to meddle with any thing 
concerning our government or mysteries of state, namely, not to speak of 
our dearest son’s match with the daughter of Spain.”107 The House replied 
with a petition appealing to its “ancient and undoubted right” of “freedom 
of speech, jurisdiction, and just censure of the house.”108 The King 
responded in kind, asserting that 
we cannot allow of the stile, calling it, your antient and undoubted 
right and inheritance; but could rather have wished, that ye had 
said, that your privileges were derived from the grace and 
permission of our ancestors and us . . . yet we are pleased to give 
103. Reprinted in MATTHEW HALE, THE ORIGINAL INSTITUTION, POWER AND JURISDICTION OF 
PARLIAMENTS 206, 216 (London, Tonson 1707). 
104. Id.
105. Hirst, supra note 96, at 853. Hirst then proceeds to insist that this passionate pushback was 
merely “political,” as distinguished from “the elaboration of clear constitutional conventions.” Id. at 
855. In the context of the customary, political English constitution, this distinction is hardly clear-cut. 
See CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 1 (“The British Constitution cannot be distinguished from institutional 
interpretations of it: the actual, current structure of institutions is constitutive of the Constitution 
itself.”). What is most important about this interaction between Crown and Parliament is that each is 
asserting its own constitutional vision and seeking to create the constitutional order that it desires. 
106. Cromartie has a useful discussion of Goodwin-Fortescue, but he—like James—ignores the 
Tudor precedents, thereby making the House’s claims appear more novel than they really were. See
CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 194-96. 
107. 1 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 1326-27. 
108. Id. at 1335. 
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you our royal assurance, that as long as you contain yourselves 
within the limits of your duty, we will be as careful to maintain and 
preserve your lawful liberties and privileges, as ever any of our 
predecessors were . . . .109
In case there was any doubt about what “containing [themselves] within 
the limits of [their] duty” meant, he clarified that they “only have need to 
beware to trench upon the prerogative of the crown.”110 In response, the 
Commons entered a protestation in their Journal, reasserting that their 
privileges were independent of the Crown, and, indeed, ran against the 
Crown.111 James made clear what he thought of that: he sent for the 
Commons’s Journal, tore out their protestation, declared it “invalid, 
annulled, void, and of no effect,”112 imprisoned some of the parliamentary 
ringleaders (including Coke), sent others off to Ireland as royal 
commissioners, and dissolved Parliament.113
Again, we see a clash of constitutional visions: the House was 
reasserting the rights that it had won under the Tudors in the face of 
James’s attempts to undermine those victories.114 The House’s response 
was to accuse James of breach of privilege—that is, to reassert its right to 
defend its own privileges, even as against the Crown. Notice how this 
power has evolved over eighty years: what began with the House 
declining royal assistance in securing the release of George Ferrers 
evolved into a language by which the House could actually work at cross-
purposes to the Crown. In some sense, of course, James still had the upper 
hand—he did, in the end, dissolve Parliament and imprison some of its 
leaders. But it is clear that the House had found a language of 
opposition—a language that derived directly from the privileges it had 
won during the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth. 
And, of course, these battles only intensified during the reign of James’s
son. From the beginning of his reign, Charles made it clear that he saw 
Parliament as his tool at best, and an inconvenience at worst. 
Parliamentary reactions were increasingly framed by the language of 
privilege: the House asserted that it had rights, and it regarded the 
Monarch’s infringement of those rights as a breach of privilege or a 
contempt of Parliament.115 Consider the proceedings against the Duke of 
Buckingham, Charles’s royal favorite, in the second Parliament of his 
109. Id. at 1344. 
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1361. 
112. Id. at 1362-63. 
113. Id. at 1366-71. 
114. See CONRAD RUSSELL, PARLIAMENTS AND ENGLISH POLITICS, 1621-1629, at 138-40 (1979) 
(describing the constitutional stakes of this dispute for both James and the House). 
115. See generally Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1100-12; see also Joyce Lee Malcolm, Doing No 
Wrong: Law, Liberty, and the Constraint of Kings, 38 J. BRIT. STUD. 161, 176 (1999) (noting that the 
language of breach of parliamentary privilege was used by the House of Commons against Charles). 
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reign.116 The House (and, indeed, much of the nation) held Buckingham 
responsible for any number of state miscues, from military defeats in 
Spain and France to the disastrous state of royal finances. When Charles’s
second Parliament refused to grant him supply until he had addressed its 
grievances, including the growing power of Buckingham, the King angrily 
replied, “I must let you know, that I will not allow any of my servants to 
be questioned amongst you, much less such as are of eminent place, and 
near unto me.”117 The House continued its investigation into Buckingham 
and adopted a report proposing to grant supply to the Crown as soon as 
“they had presented their grievances, and received his answer to them.”118
In response, Charles sent his Lord Keeper to insist that he would 
by no means suffer [royal prerogative] to be violated by any 
pretended colour of parliamentary liberty; wherein his maj. doth 
not forget that the parliament is his council, and therefore ought to 
have the liberty of a council; but his maj. understands the 
difference betwixt council and controlling, and between liberty and 
the abuse of liberty.119
Note carefully the language here: Parliament is Charles’s council. It ought 
to have “the liberty of a council.” A wise principal gives his subordinates 
certain liberties so that they may better serve him. But there is a 
“difference betwixt council and controlling”—Parliament, like other 
subordinates, must use its liberties in the service of its principal, not in an 
attempt to assert power over its principal. 
Such a claim might once have cowed the Commons, but the post-Tudor 
House had a much-expanded sense of its own institutional identity. It 
responded by asserting its “undoubted right and usage . . . to question and 
complain of all persons, of what degree soever, found grievous to the 
common-wealth.”120 It then, in direct contravention of Charles’s
commandment to “cease this unparliamentary inquisition,”121 set aside all 
other business to focus on preparing articles of impeachment against the 
Duke of Buckingham.122 Charles, enraged, dissolved the Parliament, 
without having received the funds he sought.123
This, of course, was a vicious cycle. One of Parliament’s chief 
grievances against Charles was his reliance on unconstitutional 
116. For more on Buckingham’s role in Charles’s government and on the special ire directed 
toward the Duke, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 369-76 
(2010). 
117. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 49-50. 
118. Id. at 56. 
119. Id. at 57. 
120. Id. at 69. 
121. Id. at 58. 
122. Id. at 79; see also 3 H.L. JOUR. (1626) 619-26 (reprinting the articles of impeachment). 
123. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 193-200. 
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prerogative taxation—that is, taxation not authorized by Parliament.124
When Charles refused to redress—or, indeed, even listen to—
parliamentary grievances, the House refused to vote him supply. Given the 
ruinously expensive course that Charles and Buckingham were charting in 
foreign affairs, the King’s only option was to rely yet more on prerogative 
taxation, thus increasing the intensity of parliamentary grievance.125
In the midst of Charles’s third Parliament, in 1629—mere months after 
Buckingham had been assassinated by a disgruntled army veteran126—the 
complaints over unconstitutional taxation came to a head. John Rolle, a 
merchant and member of the House, had refused to pay the customs duties 
of tonnage and poundage levied on his goods, on the grounds that they 
were illegal, as Parliament had not authorized them.127 Charles suggested 
that Rolle’s problems might disappear if the House simply authorized him 
to collect the duties; the House declined this invitation.128 In the course of 
debating the issue, members of the House explicitly used the language of 
contempt and breach of privilege to refer to royal actions.129 Charles 
promptly ordered the Speaker to adjourn the House; to prevent this, 
several of the opposition leaders physically held the Speaker in his chair 
while another presented a remonstrance asserting that the collection of 
tonnage and poundage without parliamentary consent was “a breach of the 
fundamental liberties of this kingdom.”130 The House passed this 
remonstrance, and followed it with a resolution declaring that “Whosoever 
shall counsel, or advise, the taking and levying of the subsidies of 
Tunnage and Poundage, not being granted by Parliament; or shall be an 
actor or instrument therein, shall . . . be reputed an innovator in the 
government, and a capital enemy to this kingdom and commonwealth.”131
Charles dissolved Parliament the next day;132 obviously fed up with the 
institution, he proceeded to govern without it for the next eleven years. 
What’s more, he had the parliamentary ringleaders arrested and tried 
before the King’s Bench on charges of sedition and assault (for holding 
124. See generally Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1100-16; Chafetz, supra note 116, at 369-83. 
125. For an excellent discussion of the failure of royal finances and its role in bringing about the 
Civil War, see RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 161-84. To my mind, however, Russell improperly 
minimizes the extent to which Charles’s debts were a consequence of his own decisions to undertake 
ill-advised military campaigns at the beginning of his reign. 
126. See Chafetz, supra note 116, at 374-76; Thomas Cogswell, John Felton, Popular Political 
Culture, and the Assassination of the Duke of Buckingham, 49 HIST. J. 357 (2006). 
127. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 437. 
128. Id. at 443. 
129. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1109 (quoting Sir Robert Philips and John Selden). 
130. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 490. For the rather dramatic story of the passage of this 
remonstrance and the subsequent resolutions, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 73-74; Chafetz, supra
note 71, at 1110-11. 
131. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 491. 
132. Id. at 492. 
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the Speaker in his chair).133 In their defense, the members argued that 
Parliament had exclusive jurisdiction over matters occurring on the floor 
of the House,134 essentially insisting that the Crown had breached 
parliamentary privilege in haling them before the court. The judges did not 
buy the jurisdictional defense, and the members were convicted and 
imprisoned.135
When, as a result of the Bishops’ Wars in Scotland, Charles’s need for 
funds became truly desperate in 1640, he called a new Parliament. But the 
Commons of England in Parliament Assembled had a long institutional 
memory. The House would do nothing about funds until Charles 
addressed their grievances—both the ones they already had in 1629 and 
the ones they had accumulated in the intervening years.136 The House was 
especially enraged about Charles’s order to the Speaker to adjourn the 
House and the prosecution and conviction of its members for resisting that 
order, which it asserted over and over was a “Breach of Privilege of this 
House.”137 Charles dissolved this Parliament a mere three weeks after it 
assembled; it is known to history as the “Short Parliament.” But he could 
not so easily dissolve his debts; within months, he was forced to call 
another Parliament. The “Long Parliament,” Charles’s last, was every bit 
as intent on vindicating its privileges as its predecessor had been,138 and it, 
too, was especially upset about the punishment of members in the courts 
of law for actions taken in the House.139 This Parliament would grow 
increasingly confrontational over the next year.140
133. See R. v. Elliot, Hollis & Valentine, 3 How. St. Tr. 294 (K.B. 1629). 
134. Id. at 295-300. 
135. Id. at 310. 
136. See generally THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 390-91 (11th ed. 
1960) (enumerating the grievances that the House wanted addressed); DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 210 (9th ed. 1966) (same). 
137. 2 H.C. JOUR. (1640) 7; id. at 12. 
138. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1112-13. 
139. See 2 H.C. JOUR. (1641) 200-01; id. at 203. 
140. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 136, at 393-406. It is worth noting that, by 1642, the 
confrontational attitude was no longer limited to the House of Commons. On January 12 of that year—
the same day that the Commons resolved that anyone who arrested a member by authority of a royal 
warrant alone was guilty of a breach of the privileges of Parliament, see supra text accompanying note 
12—the Lords held the Lieutenant of the Tower in contempt for obeying the King’s order to remain at 
his post rather than the Lords’ order to attend upon the House. 4 H.L. JOUR. (1642) 508. Russell refers 
to this incident as an example of Charles’s “diminished majesty.” RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 23. 
Likewise, in April of that year, when Charles dismissed the Lord Chamberlain (Essex) and the Groom 
of the Stool (Holland) for refusing to attend upon him at York, the Lords and Commons both resolved 
that Charles’s summoning of them away from Parliament and his dismissal of them when they refused 
to come were both breaches of parliamentary privilege. Moreover, they resolved that anyone who 
accepted the vacant offices “until Satisfaction be given to both Houses of Parliament” would breach 
privilege. 4 H.L. JOUR. (1642) 719. 
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CONCLUSION
And this brings us full circle—back to the Grand Remonstrance, back to 
the accusation of treason, back to Charles barging into the House, and 
back to Charles being driven from London.141 Perhaps now we are a bit 
better positioned to understand how these events came to be—that is, to 
understand what allowed the House of Commons to take the lead in 
initiating the Civil War. Parliament in the second half of the Tudor 
dynasty made great strides. They have not always been recognized as such 
by historians, for they dealt not with foreign affairs, religion, succession, 
or even taxation, but rather with the more prosaic and procedural matters 
of the House’s own privileges—its authority over its own composition, its 
ability to use the contempt power, its freedom of speech. These had 
theretofore been dealt with by Crown officers, a natural consequence of 
Parliament’s subordination to the Crown. As long as Parliament’s
institutional authority was wholly subordinated to royal authority, then of 
course who sat in Parliament would be a matter for royal judgment. And 
of course contempts against the House would be understood and punished 
as interferences with the normal functioning of royal governance. 
But in the late Tudor moment, from the 1540s through the end of 
Elizabeth’s reign, a significant shift occurred. The House itself took over 
these functions, and it did so consciously. Assuming these functions 
necessitated clashing with the Crown. That they were willing to provoke 
the Crown in this way indicates the importance the Commons assigned to 
control of these functions. Moreover, the very act of confronting the 
Crown required the House to begin articulating reasons for its positions. 
What emerged in this period was a House of Commons that was 
developing and articulating a sense of itself as a power in its own right, a 
power that need not—and, indeed, refused to—rely on any other. It was 
the development of this constitutional self-image, and its supporting 
arguments, in the late Tudor period that allowed the House to push back 
against Stuart attempts at retrenchment.142 Try as James might to dismiss 
precedents from “the Time of a Woman,” he could not will the House’s
newfound self-conception into oblivion. 
When the House of Commons refused to accept royal assistance in 
securing George Ferrers’s release, it insisted that it must be the one to 
vindicate its own rights. Contempt of Parliament is an offense against 
Parliament, and Parliament alone has jurisdiction to remedy it. The issue, 
when it was merely about George Ferrers, a private creditor, and a few 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12. 
142. In this regard, I very much agree with Lawrence Stone’s conclusion that a number of 
revisionist historians of the Civil War have “seriously under-estimated the degree of continuity in the 
constitutional struggle from crisis to crisis, as proven by the constant harping back to previous 
episodes.” STONE, supra note 42, at 167. Victories, cast as precedents, are analytically, emotively, and 
rhetorically powerful. 
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London jailers, seems like a low-stakes controversy. But the Commons’s
victory—its winning of exclusive jurisdiction over contempt—opened up 
new vistas.143 Soon it became possible to think of holding royal officials 
themselves in contempt. Indeed, it became possible to conceive of a 
contempt committed by the King himself, a fact that Charles I discovered 
shortly after he barged into the House of Commons on January 4, 1642. 
This parliamentary mobilization against the King would have significant 
consequences, both in England and beyond. In England, even after the 
royal Restoration, Parliament would be unwilling to return to its older 
role. When Charles’s son, James II, pushed too far in that direction, he too 
was deprived of his throne. And in America, the historic struggles between 
Crown and Parliament played a major role in the thinking of the rebellious 
colonists. As Jack Greene has noted, oppositional behavior of colonial 
legislatures was “deeply rooted” in the tradition of parliamentary 
opposition to the Stuart monarchs,144 opposition that was enabled by the 
procedural developments discussed in this Article. This opposition was 
also foremost in the minds of the newly independent Americans as they 
drafted and ratified their national Constitution,145 with its checks on 
executive behavior and explicit protections for legislative privileges. 
Parliamentary victories won “in the Time of a Woman” thus continue to 
have important ramifications today. 
143. Thus the “new modes of parliamentary action” that Cromartie identifies in the Stuart House 
of Commons are, in fact, deeply rooted in the Tudor House of Commons. See CROMARTIE, supra note 
32, at 190-94. 
144. JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189-90 (1994). 
145. See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 116, at 367-88 (noting the importance of the example of 
Charles I in the debates over making the American president subject to impeachment). 
